Abstract-CSMMCA protocols rely on the random deferment of packet transmissions. Like most other protocols, CSMNCA was designed with the assumption that the nodes would play by the rules, This can be dangerous, since the nodes themselves control their random deferment. Indeed, with the higher programmability of the network adapters, the temptation to tamper with the software or firmware is likely to grow; hy doing so. a user could obtain a much larger share of the available bandwidth at the expense of other users.
I. INTRODUCTION
CarTier-sense multiple-access with collision avoidance (CSMNCA) protocols rely on the random deferment of packet transmissions for the efficient use of a shared wireless channel among many nodes in a network; this class of MAC protocols is one of the most popular for wireless networks. In general, it is assumed that all nodes respect the rules of the protocol. However, we claim that this assumption is less and less appropriate, because the network adapters are becoming more and more progrumtnable [l] . As a result, today a user can modify the behavior of his wireless interface very easily. In this paper. we study the stability and efficiency of wireless networks that contain one or several seysh users. By "selfish" we designate the users who are ready to tamper with their wireless interface in order to increase their own share of the common transmission resource; we assume these users lo be rational, and not malicious (they are ready to harm other users only if they can derive a benefit from this misbehavior). More specifically, we consider that a cheater makes use of the easiest (and yet highly rewarding) cheating technique: he deliberately does not respect the random deferment of the transmission of his packets. Although this cheating technique is straightforward, we show that studying its implications is far from trivial. In order to be able to corroborate our simulations with analytical results, we make use of game theory: each node is a player, the throughput it enjoys is its payoff, and the size of its contention window represents its move. By making use of this model and of extensive simulations. we systematically study several problems. First, we consider the simple case of a network with a single cheater. We then assume the presence of several cheaters, and characterize two families of Nash equilibria in a single stage game, one of which always results in a network collapse. We compute the Pareto-optimal point of operation of such a system, and study the equilibria of dynamic games. We introduce the notion of cooperative players, namely cheaters who try to continue operating at the Pareto-optimal point of operarion. We also propose a detection and a punishment technique against those players who exhibit a non-cooperative behavior. Finally, we explain how the players can collectively search for the optimal point of operation, even if they are unaware of the number of nodes present in the network.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to provide a systematic analysis of rational cheating in CSMAKA networks. To make it as concrete as possible, we refer to the most prominent version of CSMAICA, namely IEEE 802.1 1; however, the conclusions we derive are valid for any protocol of the CSMAKA family.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section addresses the related work. Section III describes the system model considered in the paper. Section IV studies the case of a static game, whereas Section V studies the case of a dynamic game. Section VI shows the deviation detection and penalization mechanisms we use. Section VI1 analyzes the of the system (Nash equilibrium), and calculate the transmission probabilities that optimize each node's throughput. They assume that all nodes have the same transmission rates and costs. Moreover, every node has an a priori knowledge about the total number of nodes in the system. Altman et al. [3] reconsider the same Aloha "game" with partial information.
where the transmission probability is adapted according io collision feedback only. They consider two frameworks: team work and non-cooperative game. Jin and Kesidis 141 study noncooperative equilibria of Aloha networks for heterogeneous users. For IEEE 802.11, Kyasanur and Vaidya [5] propose that the receiver assigns the backoff value to be used by the sender, so the former can detect any misbehavior of the latter.
If the sender deviates from the assigned value, it will be assigned high backoff values on the next round to compensate its deviation. As mentioned by the authors. this mechanism has several limitations such as the possible collusion between sender and receiver, and the fundamental change to the protocol. Konorski [6] proposes a misbehaviour-resilient backoff algorithm; both [SI and [61 exhibit the same drawback: they require to change the current protocol. Game theory has been applied in the study of optimal routing I71, [XI, [9] , congestion control [lo] . power control [ll] , 1121, as well as incentive engineering in wireless access networks [131.
SYSTEM MODEL
We consider N wireless nodes that are willing to transmit data to N designated receivers (one per sender). In this study, we assume all the nodes to be within the same communication range (i.e., each node can hear any other node). This is to avoid complications introduced by the hidden terminal problem Nodes use a CSMNCA based protocol to resolve contention at the MAC layer. In this paper, we will be dealing exclusively with IEEE 802.11 (in DCF mode) [14] ; we note that the analysis carried out in this paper can also be extended to other CSMAlCA based protocols. We further assume each node to have an authentic MAC layer identifier. This can be achieved by means of MAC layer authentication. Finally, we assume that the nodes are static and that they always have packets (of the same size) to send. Possible ways to relax some of the above assumptions are discussed in Section VII.
We consider a scenario where out of the N senders, a subset of C nodes deliberately deviate from the IEEE 802.1 1 protocol. We designate this subset of nodes as cheaters. There can be a number of ways in which a node can chear. For example, in violation of the standard protocol, a cheater 2 initializes his window size to a lower value in order to obtain a higher throughput. We will call this lower valuc \Vi throughoul the paper. Moreover, a cheater does nor respect the binaq' e.xponenlial backoff principle and keeps his contention window size fixed after a collision, i.e. equal to Wi. This mode of' cheating is the easiest for potential cheaters, since it does not require changes to be made in the operation of IEEE 802.11 protocol. However. the main conclusions of this paper are applicable to any other cheating technique.
The relevance of these misbehaving techniques becomes even higher with the emerging standards that address the Quality of Service support, such as EEE 802.1 le [15] . The latter gives the users total control of the MAC parameters, therefore enabling them to easily cheat. We assume the chealers in our model to be rational, i.e., they want to maximize their own benefit. In this particular context, the cheaters want to maximize the average throughput they receive T~. This problem can easily be modeled in a game theory framework. All the cheater nodes are the players in this game. The strategy of each (cheater) player i consists in setting the value of his contention window Wi such that player i's expected payoff (utility) U, is maximized. In this work, we define a player i's utility to be equal to the enjoyed throughput ~i (Le., r/, = ~i ) .
Iv. STATIC GAME
In this section. we fist analyze the problem of misbehaving from the perspective of a single cheater and then consider more complex scedarios with multiple cheaters in the system. We model the cheaters' interaction using a static game [16] . A static game is one in which all players make decisions (or select a strategy) simultaneously. without knowledge of the strategies that are being chosen by other players.
A. Variation of throughput with Wi
In 1171, Bianchi presented a saturation throughput model for the E E E 802.11 protocol. Since we assume that a cheater's objective is to maximize his throughput (and we assume he always has a packet to send), he will tend to use the full channel capacity (i.e., the system will operate at the saturation point where Pi" = T~ nj+( l -~~) is the probability that an arbitrary station successfully transmits during a random time slot; G is the access probability of station i ; is the average size of a packet; P5 = C k is the average time needed to transmit a packet of size L (including the inter-frame spacing periods [17] 
is the probability of the channel being idle; T g is the duration of the idle period (a single slot); Pc = 1 -Pi -x k P i is the probability of collision; TC is the average time spent in the collision. 
-. 
which, for T" 2 T" and T; < 1, j # i , is always negative'. We will now verify this claim by simulations performed in ns-2 [19] . The simulation setup' consists of N = 20 nodes 'Accordrng to IEEE 802.11 [14] we have the followng: 
B. Nush equilibria of a slatic garne
Based on the cheaters' payoff fimction defined above, in this subsection we study the equilibria of a static game model. The solution concept we will be using to study the static game is Nash equilibrium [16] . In this study we do not consider wellbehaved nodes.
We fist investigate whether a Nash equilibrium point exists for the system or not. We will study the existence of a Nash equilibrium point by making use of the concept of a player's best-response fidnction ( S$: is unity (i.e., bw-; = (1)). Finally, assuming that ri = 1 for some player k, the proposition follows trivially from Proposition 2; Our static game admits exactly bV&z -(lVmaz -1)" Nash equilibria, where C is the number of cheaters and Wmaz is the maximum value of the cheaters' contention window. 1. Then his access probability 7," = 1 and consequently for all players
it follows that rj = 0 ( j + i) for 
However, since we assume that each cheater strives to attain the most of the channel capacity, the most likely equilibrium is the one at which more ban one cheater sets Wi = I, therefore:
Corollary I : In the presence of more than one cheater, each player's payoff most likely equals zero
This result is know as the lragedy of the commons in economics.
C. Fairness and Pareto-upfiimality
According to the analysis of the earlier section, there exist two families of Nash equilibrium points. In one family, we have great unfairness (only a singIe cheater gets some positive payoff). In the second family, we have highly undesirable equilibria resulting in a zero payoff for every cheater. Therefore, we look for an alternative solution to the CSMA/CA game. A desirable solution of the CSMAKA game should exhibit the equation (2).
II

Proof
Assume that for player i we have W+ any unity element. following three properties: (i) the solution should be unique, (ii) the solution should result in a fair distribution of the system throughput (.and each cheater should achieve a strictly positive payoff3), and (iii) the solution should result in system optimal allocation of the available capacity.
To derive such a solution we use the Nash bargaining framework from cooperative game theory [20]. The Nash bargaining framework is used to model a situation in which the players negotiate on which point of the set of joint feasible payoffs R they will agree upon. In our case,
where the functions j t are derived from equations (2) and (31. An important element of the Nash bargaining framework is a fixed disagreement vector r0 = (ry, . . . , T : ) , where usually r: = maxi inin+r;. The role of the disagreement point is to provide an incentive for the agreement point to take effect; in case negotiations break down, the outcome becomes T O = (T:, . . . , T : ) . In the case of our CSMNCA game, ~9 = maximin+ ri = 0 (i.e., each node can simply obstruct the traffic of any other node) and hence the disagreement vector is ro = ( 0 , . . . , O ) . Note here that the disagreement vector corresponds to the Nash equilibrium of the static game. which gives high credibility to the disagreement vector. Thus the whole bargaining problem can be described conveniently by the pair (R, r o ) . To solve this problem, Nash took an axiomatic approach and proposed a solution to (R: r") that results in a unique vector r* = (ry,. , .) r z ) satisfying a certain set of properties [20] . In this work. we are interested in the following properties of the Nash solution: fi) uniqueness, Cii) fairness, and (iii) system optimality (i.e., Pareto-optimality) .
A well-known result states that if the set R is compact and convex, and there exiscs at least one T E R such that T > T O , then the unique solution to the bargaining problem ( R , T O ) corresponds to the unique solution of the following optimization problem 1205:
i= 1 The Nash bargaining framework has already been proposed for fair bandwidth allocation for elastic services in wired networks by Yaiche et. al. [lo] . The important difference between the Nash bargaining framework (the framework used in [LO] ) and our CSMA/CA game is that the set of feasible payoffs R is neither compact nor convex in our CSMAlCA game. Nevertheless, we will show that the optimization problem (5) with R being the (non-convex and noncompact) set of feasible payoffs of our CSMAlCA game has a unique solution exhibiting Pareto-optimality and fairness properties (similar to the properties of the Nash bargaining solution of the problem ( 5 ) where R is a convex and compact set [201).
By taking the logarithm of the objective function of ( 5 ) we define the corresponding Lagrangian as follows:
From the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker first-order necessary conditions [Zl], we have:
Now, it is easily seen that ai = pi = 0, i = 1:. . . , C . This follows from the fact that there exists a feasible vector W such that that the optimal value of the equivalent to II2, i.e., n,,l(ri -9.9) is strictly positive. Likewise, ri = B implies rj = T:(= O ) , V j # i, which in turn implies Hi=, (q -r,") = 0. Then. the first-order Kuhn-Tucker conditions reduce to:
C C Plugging (6) into the first condition of the corresponding instance of nz, i.e., E :
, ri = C k , we finally obtain: v. DYNAMIC GAME Having determined the Pareto-optimal point W', we now intend to devise a strategy allowing the cheaters to converge to this point. For this purpose, we make use of the theory of dynamic and repeated gumes [221, [16] . Using the dynamic game mode1, we devise a simple distributed algorithm that cheaters can use to converge to a desired Nash equilibrium point. Again. we assume Wi (i.e., ~i ) to be a continuous variable.
A. G a m for'ririalation
We extend the game theory model introduced in Section IV-A to a dynamic game model in which the players are allowed to make their decisions based on previous actions and system states. We assume that our dynamic game is played infinitely long. We also assume all the nodes to be cheaters, i.e., C = N . Let C denote the set comprising all the cheaters. In the new game theoretic model the cheater's (player's) utility function Ji takes the following form:
where Pi denotes a penalty function. Let us assume. for the moment, that Pi is defined to be: Based on the Lagrangian function L(7i,Xi), we can obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for Ji to be maximized for each player i E C. It is known from the convex optimization theory (with inequality constraints) that in order for the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker first order conditions to be sufficient for Ji to be maximized. Ji has to be a concave function, whereas constraint ~i 5 1 has to be convex. quasiconvex or linear [Zl) . Indeed, in our case T~ 5 1 is a linear constraint in T~. Furthermore, using the approximation T s = T" (see footnote 1, Section IV-A), Ji is a concave function in ~i i.e., 
TC.
We know from Lemma 1 that at a Nash equilibrium, ri should satisfy equation (.12). As we want to make a Nash equilibrium, we simply set y* = 7. Then we rewrite (12) with y* = 7 and obtain:
Thus, player i ' s payoff function becomes:
Note that at the Nash equilibrium point -ri = 7 , V i E C, the following holds: J~( I )
It is interesting to note that even if P i takes negative vaIues for ~i < L, in which case P i can be seen as a reward function, the best choice for the node is still ri = 77, where Pi = 0. This suggests the following redefinition of player i's payoff function Jg:
Therefore, by an appropriate selection of ki, we have made -T a unique Nash equilibrium for all players i E C. Next we derive an algorithm that leads the players to the unique Nash equilibrium point ri = 1, V i E C. The first issue to be resolved is the following: How do the players agree on the Nash equilibrium point T~ = I, V i E C, to which they all should converge? A simple way to resolve this is to define: in which case Pi can be seen as the penalty that the player with the lowest accessing probability (the highest contention window) inflicts on player i . Let k denote an arbitrary player such that r k = I. that is. k E {arg miniEc T~} .
Observe that we obtain the equivalent problem, i t . , optimal T~' S (where i + k) for the one problem are also optimal for the other problem. This is because: (i) T~) exhibit similar behaviors in T~ ( i # k ) (it., both are strictly decreasing in '-ri < 1 (i # k) and zero if 3 j such that T~ = 11, and (ii) q. is a constant equal to 7 . Furthermore, by taking the logarithm of flifC\jkl(l -~i )
(as in Section IV-C) we arrive at the equivalent optirmzation problem n4:
(18)
TI; = (n niEc\{k](l -T i ) q / j w i -4) and l -I i t C \ ( k ) ( l l rnaxCiEc,jkl log(1 -G )
We next write the Lagrangian for n4 as follows: n, : s.1.
U7-h %PI = = &\(r;)
From the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker first order necessary conditions
there exists strictly positive solutions to n4). Thus, the above Lagrangian reduces to L ( T -~, a) = CiEC,lkl 1(7,), where
(~~) log(-T~) -a i (~-q ) .
Since 1(-ra) IS strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable, I ( T~) admits a unique solution obtained from:
= 0. Thus we have:
In order to obtain a distributed algorithm that leads the players to the Nash equilibrium 7 , we finally consider the dual problem Ii5 of II4 as follows:
Now we can solve the dual problem l I , by using the following gradient-based method [231:
where 7 > 0 is a step size, and where the differentiability of We describe and study a possible implementation of the two mechanisms in Section VI.
As can be seen from the payoff function (I4), in order to evaluate the correct penalty to be inflicted on some node i, another node j has to calculate (estimate) the values c i , k = 1: 1, 3, effectively meaning that the node j has Lo estimate, at the same time, the access probabilities of all the other nodes. In Section VI-A, we show how to alleviate this requirement by introducing a simpler penalty function that preserves all the important properties of the penalty function given by (9).
We now address the remaining challenge of how to achieve the most efficient 1, i.e., the Pareto-optimal point in the sense of Section IV-C.
D. Moving Nash equilibrium
To make the Pareto-optimal poiat W * a Nash equilibrium, we use the fact that W * is the only point satisfying the firstorder necessary conditions (see Fig. 2 ). Let T * denote the corresponding optimal access probability vector.
Initially, cheaters set their access probabilities to some value close to 1 (but strictly smaller than 1): i.e., ~( 0 ) < 1. The cheaters also have to make sure that T * 5 ~( 0 ) .
The cheaters then start running algorithm (19)- (20) until they stabilize at some Nash equilibrium point T~( O )
One player (cheater), say i , will eventually decrease its current T~ by some small value e. i.e., ~~( 1 ) = ~p ( 1 ) -t. This will in turn trigger the penalizing mechanism of player i and puIl the other players to a new Nash equilibrium point, since they also run algorithm (19)-(2O) . At this stage, each player j will compare its current payoff Jj (1) (at the new Nash equilibrium point) to the payoff J j ( 0 ) achieved at the previous Nash equilibrium point. If IJj (1) -J j ( 0 ) 1 < 6, where 6 > 0 is some appropriately chosen small value, the players terminate their search, since they have reached close proximity of the Paretooptimal point r* (i.e., W * ) . Otherwise, the players repeat the previous steps. Since every point at which the players stabilize is a Nash equilibrium point (Proposition 4), we have achieved OUT goal of making the Pareto-optimal point W * (or some point close to 1Y*) a Nash equilibrium point.
One important point about the procedure just described is that it requires the players to deviate from a Nash equilibrium point to reach the Pareto equilibrium point bV*. At first sight this may look confusing: Why should a player deviate from a Nash equilibrium point? The answer is simple. The game in our new model is played infinitely long (an infinitely repeated game). For this reason, the players can afford any finite number of deviations from a Nash equilibrium point (i.e.. for 0 < k < 03. limT,,
VI. DEVIATION DETECTION AND PENALIZATION
In this section, we propose a distributed and practical implementation of the two key building blocks for the model of dynamic games, namely, the penalization mechanism and the detection mechanism. Before describing the two mechanisms, we introduce (and analyze) a penalty function simpler than the one given by (9). and preserve its most important property (notably, the uniqueness of the maximizer). Proof: Since 7 -6 < 1: we have dri/&i > 0 for ~i E [O: 11. Therefore, on the interval [0,74 T~ = re is the unique maximizer of the utility function J i (~i ) = r;(ri). We conclude the proof by observing that for the remaining interval (re, I] we have aJi/a.ri = 87-i/8q -8pi/8q < 0, i.e., Ji(~i) is a strictly decreasing function in ri E (re, 11.
Consider node j that calculates the penalty Pi to be inflicted on node i as follows:
We thus see that the penalty function P; given by (22) satisfies the sufficient condition of Proposition 5. Therefore, for fixed T~ < I, ~i = T~ is a unique maximizer of the
Thus, similarly to the the penalty fUnction (9) . the new penalty function and pi = ri -rj ~ j E { arg minkEc n}).
In the context of two cheaters i and j , a very important property of the new penalty function is that a penalty has to be such that it results in the same throughputs for both cheater i and cheater j . Indeed, Ji = ri -Pi = r j = J j , where Ji and .Ij represent the resulting throughputs. We will see shortly (in Section VI-C) that this property of "throughput equalization" requires far less information at the side of the cheater who inflicts a penalty, when compared to the penalty function (9).
In what follows, we first describe the detection mechanism helping each cheater j to assess if some other cheater i is receiving a higher throughput (Section VI-B). If this is the case, we say that cheater i has deviared from cheater j's point of view. Then, in Section VI-C, we describe the penalizing mechanism that the cheaters use against the deviating cheater(s) such that their throughputs become equal.
B. Detection tnechanisnr
In our approach, each cheater measures the throughput of each other node', including itself. This is indeed feasible due to the broadcast nature of the wireless medium. If a cheater observes a difference in throughput with some other node, it characterizes that node as a deviating cheater. Let ~i and rj be the measured throughput of nodes i and j, respectively. Due to the inherent short-time unfairness of the IEEE 802.1 1 MAC protocol [24] , and in order to increase the efficiency of the detection mechanism, we introduce two parameters: the observation time-window size Tobsr in seconds, and the tolerance margin in percentage of throughput. After measuring the throughput of each node for robs seconds, node i concludes that node j is deviating whenever the throughput of node j exceeds the throughput of node i i.e., r j / T i '> 1 + c.
We have implemented this detection mechanism in ns-2.
with N = C = 30 nodes. We vary the contention window size ( W j ) of a single node j , and set others' contention window sizes to 30 ( I K j = 30). Fig. 3 shows the performance of the detection mechanism for different values of Tabs and e. The 5We deliberately use the word node, since in reality well-behaved nodes may l x present as well (even though we neglect them in the analysis).
probability of false positives corresponds to the probability of detection with W j = 30; at this point, node j uses a contention window value equal to that of node i, but still gets a higher throughput, ~j / ? ' i = 1.06, due to the IEEE 802.1 1 unfairness. Therefore, node j gets detected as deviating with positive detection probability. To reduce the false positives (at contention window size 301, one can consider large e values ( 2 10%). However, this comes at the expense of lower detection probabilities if cheater j uses contention window sizes slightly lower than 30. Similarly. large Tabs values ( 2 15s) will reduce the effect of the inherent IEEE 802.1 1 unfairness, and therefore the corresponding false positives. This also comes at the expense of lower detection probabilities if cheater j uses contention window sizes slightly lower than 30. Therefore, choosing appropriate values for Tabs and E is crucial to our detection mechanism. For very low contention window sizes of cheater j (TVj 5 20), the throughput ratio r j / r ; is much larger than 1 -I-6, malung detection of the cheater j ' s deviation easy.
C. Penalizing mechanism
The action taken by cheaters in response to non-cooperation (deviation) by another cheater is termed as a penalizing mechanism. In Section V, we expressed the cost of this penalizing scheme (imposed by another cheater) on a cheater by the penalty function. We note that a penahzing scheme shouId be designed so that it does not bring any performance degradation to penalizing cheaters. This can be achieved by seledively jarnming the deviating cheater's packets. Indeed in CSMAKA networks, we can single out a deviating cheater for punishment, since only one station (within the same collision domain) can transmit at a time. In game theory, this property is know as fulr dimensionality [ 
161.
We have designed a simple penalizing scheme, in which the packets of the non-cooperative cheater are selectively jammed for a short duration of time, T j a n l , by the other cheaters in the system. Suppose cheater i detects the presence of a non-cooperative (deviating) cheater 4. Thereafter, if cheater i listens to a transmitted packet corresponding to cheater j , it switches to transmission mode and jams enough bits so that the packet cannot be properly recovered at the receiver.
Meanwhile, all other cheaters in the system should be able to read the header of the jammed frame and properly update their NAV (net allocation vector). This is to avoid waiting for ELFS [14] . which would reduce the system's efficiency. Therefore, jamming should be done on frame payloads rather than frame headers. This is indeed possible since the transceiver's turnaound time, which is on the order of 5 ps [14] , is much shorter than the data frame transmission time, which is of the order of 700 p s (depending on the data rate and the packet size).
Let the throughput obtained by the two considered cheaters over the last observation window, ;robsr be ri and r j , respectively, where rj/ri > 1 t E . As we saw in Section VI-A, the penalizing mechanism is aimed at making the throughputs received by cheaters i and j equal. Thus, the throughput We have implemented the jamming mechanism in ns-2. The simulation setup is the same as in Section IV-A ( N = 20, C = 10). We randomly pick up a cheater, designated as cheater X, and fix his contention window size to be 10.
The contention window size for all the other cheaters in the system is fixed to tbe Pareto-optimal ( W * ) value of 30. We use the observation window size, 'Tabs, of 20 seconds, and the tolerance margin, E , of 5% in the detection mechanism. Thus, any unilateral deviation from this point, W X < W' or W , > IV*, brings less payoff (throughput) for cheater X.
Therefore, no cheater will have any incentive for deviating unilaterally from the Pareto-optimal point of operation and hence it is at Nash equilibrium.
Based on the two building blocks described in the previous section, we will now build a comprehensive and distributed protocol that guides multiple. selfish nodes to the Paretooptimal Nash equilibrium point W' . A. Adaptive strategy
Inspired by the algorithm (19)- (20); we have implemented the following adaptive strategy. When cheater i observes that he is being jammed (penalized) during some period A, he gradually increases his contention window by steps of size T. Note that a cheater can easily decide whether he is being jammed by observing his own throughput. The choice of A determines the efficiency of the system. For example, choosing a small vdue of A might magnify the effect of misdetection by unnecessarily causing a cheater to increase his contention window size. This will eventually lead the whole system towards an inefficient point of operation. The choice of the step size, y, offers a tradeoff between convergence time and efficiency. If we increase the contention window in large steps, though the system will stabilize in less time, the point of operation might be far away from the Pareto-optimal point (I+-*), resulting in an inefficient system and vice-versa.
We have implemented this adaptive strategy in ns-2. The simulation setup is the same as in the previous section ( N = 20,C = 107W* = 30). We randomly pick up a cheater, designated as node S , and fix his contention window size to 10. The contention window size for all the other cheaters in the system is fixed to W * . We fix A to be 5 seconds and y to be 5. One can observe (cf. [NI) how node x' adapts its contention window size by following the adaptive strategy and eventually converging 'to a window size of 30, equal to W t . Thus the other cheaters in the system are successful in guiding the misbehaving cheater to reach the optimal point of operation. Table I summarizes the throughput averages obtained by different nodes over a time interval bf 1000 seconds. As can be observed from Table I , the jamming and detection mechanism combined with the adaptive strategy, besides being fair to all the cheaters in the system, is also the most efficient. Note that even the introduction of the adaptive strategy does not encourage the abuse of jamming. Cheater A ' might try to unnecessarily jam other cheaters, hoping that an increase in the contention window sizes by all the cheaters (following the adaptive strategy) will get him more throughput. However, eventually cheater x' will be identified as a misbehaving cheater, because of the throughput difference, by the other cheaters in the system. In turn. cheater X will be forced to increase his own contention window size, due to the penalizing mechanism. As a result, every cheater i, including cheater X, will now be operating at an inefficient point of operation (Wi > W * ) . Thus cheaters have no incentive to over-jam other cheaters in the system. Finally, we evaluate the performance of our protocol in a scenario consisting of muhiple levels of misbehavior in the system. The simulation setup is the same as in the previous section ( N = 20, C = 10, W * = 30). We randomly pick up three cheaters, designated as node x', I' and 2. We fix their contention window sizes to be 5, 10 and 15, respectively. The contention window size for all fhe other cheaters in the system is fixed to W * . Fig. 5 plots the evolution of the contention window sizes of the different cheaters over time. Since each deviating cheater is punished in proportion to its misbehavior, each of them eventually converges to W * and the system continues to operate at this stable point of operation. Thus, our protocol self-adapts to the different levels of misbehavior in the system. As can be observed from Table 11 , the jamming mechanism combined with the adaptive strategy results in the optimal and fair performance, even with multiple levels of misbehavior in the system, B. Reaching the Pareto-optimal point An accurate implementation of the detection, penalizing and adaptive strategy will lead the nodes to reach an equilibrium point, N. However. the intention is to reach the Pareto point of operation, IV*. As we described in Section V-D, this can be achieved by using a simple gradient climbing algorithm. At the onset of the system, assume Wi = Wl" for all cheaters.
Every cheater secs up a random timer (in our simulations this corresponds to a random value between 0 and 20 seconds) to increase his contention window by a step of size y. We have implemented this protocol in as-2. The simulation setup consists of 20 nodes and 7 cheaters ( N = 20,C = 7).
The cheaters initialize their contention window size to 5 (W,"" = 5). The cheaters continue their search for W * only if they see an increase of 10% or more in their throughput from the last stable point of operation. Fig. 6 (a) plots a sample evolution of the contenuon window for 2 arbitrary chosen cheaters, X and Y , in the system. Note that all of the cheaters follow a similar pattern and eventually converge to a window size of 20. We are unable to show their evolution in the same plot as it simply generates overlapping lines. Fig. S(b) plots the aggregated throughput obtained by all the cheaters at different contention window sizes. As can be seen from Fig. 6ib) , the throughput is mrucimized at LVi = 20. In reality, the cheaters will stop at Wi equal to 20 and the system will continue to operate at this point of operation. For completeness, we obtain the "dotted" curve in Fig. 6(b) by deliberately forcing the cheaters to go beyond Wi = 20.
C. Discismion
As can be seen from Table I1 (Section VII-A), wellbehaved nodes, which continue to follow the IEEE 802.1 1 protocol. obtain negligible throughput fiom the system. Thus, in the presence of cheaters in the system, we speculate that eventually all the nodes in the system will start to behave as cheaters. As they strive for optimal contention window size, even in such a scenario, our protocol will be at least as efficient as the normal EEE 802.1 1 protocol. Note that our goal in this paper is prevent network collapse, in an efficient way, rather than finding the optimal contention window for a network of AT = C nodes [25] , [17] . However, our adaptive cheating algorithm leads to the same optimal point, without explicit knowledge of the number of contending nodes. As mentioned earlier, we adopted throughput-based detection to simplify the presentation. However, the use of more adequate detection mechanisms, such as back@-!" detection [ll (Le., comparing the nodes' average backoffs) is needed in general, for example in the following two scenarios.
Hidderi terminal problem. A challenge here is that a node belonging to two different clusters, hidden from each other, will suffer unfair shares in both clusters. To cope with this problem, we can take a similar approach as in the present work. Thus, we &st define (axiomatically) a desirable point of operation that will exhibit a reasonable fairness metric. and then we find a distributed algorithm that reaches this poi,nt. In general topology networks, it may be plausible to use backoffbased detection mechanisms [l].
Different trafic constraints.
Since CSMAKA is time-fair rather than throughpubfair, flows with different constraints (e.g., different packet lengths) will result in different throughputs, even without cheating. Hence, throughput-based detection mechanisms cannot be applied since nodes are not supposed to know each other's traffic constraints. Again, backoffbased detection mechanisms are more appropriate.
VIII. COSCLUSIONS
In this paper we have addressed the problem of cheating in CSMA/CA networks. For this purposc, we have developed a game-theoretical model and verified our findings by appropriate simulations. We have made several contributions. First, we have provided a formalism for the systematic study of rational cheating. Second, we have studied the simple cases (i) of a single cheater and (ii) of several cheaters acting without restraint. Third, we have identified the Parelo-optimal point of operation of a network with multiple cheaters. Fourth, we have shown how it is possible to transform this Pareto-optimal point into a Nash equilibrium. Fifth, we have shown that smart cheaters can collrctively find this point. We believe these contributions to be very relevant in wireless networks.
In terms of future work, we intend to study in more detail general topology networks (involving hidden terminals), We wilI also try to define a punishment technique that is less intrusive than jamming. Finally, we intend to adapt this approach to problems beyond CSMA/CA networks: a possible direction is to study how smart cheating could become a technique to collectively fine-tune the behavior of a protocol.
APPENDIX PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4 (SKETCH)
To prove the convergence of the iterative procedure described by equations (19) and (20), we will show that function
f ( a i ( t ) )
F c q ( t ) -y (~~?~~( t j -~)
is a contraction mapping for the appropriately chosen step size 7 . Thus, we have to show that the following holds (for brevity, we drop index i from ai(t) and 7,PPt(t), as well as opt from qF@(t)):
By substituting f(o,(t)) and in turn ~( t ) = 1 -l / a ( t ) , and after some reordering we obtain that the following condition has to be met for f ( a i ( t ) ) to be a contraction mapping: 1 1 -Y / 4 t ) 4 t + 111 < 1 .
(24 1 From (24) we have 0 < y < 3Cy(f)a(f 4-1). Thus, if we can show that a(t) > 0 for all t 2 0, then there exists (an arbitrary small) y > 0 such that f(az(t)) is a contraction mapping. We observe that at t = 0, a(t) > 1 (i.e., by assumption 1 > ~( 0 ) > t 3. 0). We will show that a ( t ) > 1 for all t > 0. By definition a(1) = a(0) -y (~( 0 ) 
